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Background: It is important to distinguish between 
evaluation as an inherent, automatic, affective process 
and Program Evaluation (Evaluation, with capitalised 
‘E’) as an institution, and equally important to consider 
what a good understanding of evaluation tells us about 
Evaluation. Evaluation is an established social institution 
whose modern roots can be traced back to 16th century 
France. Since the early 1900s the institution has 
developed within and across a range of scientific 
disciplines with interests in perceived social problems 
and efforts to resolve the said problems. This can be 
demonstrated objectively by the number and scale of 
relevant publications within relevant disciplines. This, in 
turn, helps us understand more about Evaluation as an 
institution. Set in this context is the question of 
Evaluation Science: is this simply a fashionable 
institutional motif or is it a potential new era for 
Evaluation? 
 
Purpose: Commentary on the history and development 
of Program Evaluation. 
 
Setting: Not applicable. 
 
Intervention: Not applicable. 
 
Research design: Not applicable. 
 
Data collection & analysis: Not applicable. 
 
Findings: Not applicable. 
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Program Evaluation (Evaluation, hereafter) is 
an institution. That is, in the simplest possible 
terms, it is an established pattern of 
behaviour, including thinking, feeling, and 
acting, with an accompanying set of beliefs 
and values (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Gerth & 
Mills, 1953; Judd. 1926, 1936; Scott, 1995, 
2004). By Evaluation I mean a value-based 
judgement of the merit and/or worth and/or 
significance of an intervention or program 
stemming from a policy of some sort or 
another. The intervention or program is 
intended to bring about a beneficial change of 
some sort for a group of people, the evaluand. 
Evaluation is not bound to any one particular 
discipline, profession, or field of practice and 
in this sense it is both somewhat unusual and 
permeable. Like all institutions it is highly 
susceptible to fashions and trends. One of the 
current fashions is the attempt to rebrand 
Evaluation as Evaluation Science. A number 
of recent discussions about the notion of 
Evaluation Science led me to review my long-
term interest in the historical development, or 
evolution, of Evaluation into its current form. 
 Attempting to address the historical 
development of an institution is problematic 
from within the confines of the institution, not 
least due to the typical short-term focus on 
recent history and the requirement to adhere 
to the current beliefs and values of the 
institution. The Evaluation institution, for 
example, typically assumes Evaluation 
emerged in the United States between 1933-
1936 and that Evaluation is transdisciplinary. 
Neither, I argue here, is the case. For 
clarification, evaluation per se is clearly 
transdisciplinary. That is, the act or process of 
evaluating is part and parcel of any discipline 
and, indeed, is an integral process that has 
been studied in some depth. In this sense 
evaluation is not a discipline in and of itself 
and neither is it an institution as it occurs 
regardless of either of these constructs. To be 
sure, it can be exercised within and between 
disciplines and institutions as an artefact, but 
it does not depend on either. Program 
Evaluation, on the other hand, is the use of 
evaluation as an artefact to make a judgement 
about an object where the object is a program. 
As such, Evaluation can be an institution, and 
arguably is, given its long history and 
prevalence. Whether or not Evaluation can be 
a discipline in its own right is a separate 
matter. 
 I suggest, here, that the assumption that 
an already existing institution can become a 
distinct self-affirmed discipline that owns a 
process common to all is fundamentally flawed 
at best. That is not to say we cannot have a 
self-affirmed discipline whose object of inquiry 
is the process of Evaluation. But I suggest 
there are some difficulties with wider support 
for that notion given that existing disciplines 
are already heavily engaged with this activity 
and have been for a long period of time. 
Education, for example, has a long history of 
Evaluating their own Evaluation methods and 
processes, as does Economics as does 
Psychology (this is referred to below). 
 Regarding the question of Evaluation 
Science, this, again, is neither a current 
development nor one either limited to, or 
owned by, Evaluation. It is an emerging 
fashionable institutional motif already 
established, at the time of writing, outside of 
Evaluation. That does not mean it has no use. 
It does mean that, as with all fashionable 
motifs, caution should be exercised with 
regard to adjusting institutional beliefs and 
values to accommodate such an object. 
 This paper starts by addressing the 
question of the very nature of evaluation, and 
follows this with an exploration of the role of 
evaluation in science. It then addresses the 
question, ‘What is [Program] Evaluation?,’ and 
considers a plausible long-term history of the 
institution. Next it provides a disciplinary 
perspective of the recent history of the 
institution followed by a critique of the concept 
of Evaluation Science. It concludes with some 
consideration of how Evaluation might 
continue to develop. 
 As noted above, the developmental history 
of an institution is difficult to conduct from 
within the boundaries of the institution, no 
matter how permeable those boundaries. This 
paper makes extensive use of texts from 
outside of Evaluation as objects. This may be 
uncomfortable for the institution not least as 
it may challenge current beliefs and value 
positions endorsed within the institution’s 
proprietary literature. Nonetheless, the very 
nature of Evaluation as an institution makes 
16    Fear 
 
 
it important that it rise to just such a 
challenge. 
 
What is Evaluation? 
 
Without the need to be prosaic, any evaluation 
has, at its core, a value judgement. That is, 
evaluation is the process of valuing, judging, 
or assessing, the inherent and/or pragmatic 
worth of an object according to set of values 
(‘worth’ can of course be segmented further 
into ‘merit’ and ‘significance’ or other sets of 
elements) and endowing it with meaning, 
where meaning is dependent upon values and 
is itself a process of valuing. Any object (and a 
process can be an object) can be evaluated and 
it will be evaluated in relation to the set of 
values employed. 
 A value judgement, an evaluation, is an 
affective process that is to some extent 
automatic, although to what extent varies 
according to other available mechanisms. The 
process is deeply rooted in emotions and, by 
default, in the beliefs the individual and/or 
group are most invested in. The degree to 
which this process can be managed, controlled 
if you prefer, is open to question and seems 
determined by attitude towards the object, 
attitude being equally value based. (This is 
explored in depth in The Psychology of 
Evaluation; Musch & Klauer, 2008). 
 Automatic evaluations can be 
spontaneously and immediately constructed 
without previous experience and conscious 
appraisal of the object (Ferguson & Bargh, 
2008) and yet high fluency with the object is 
associated with more favourable evaluations of 
the object. (Winkielman et. al., 2008). Simply 
articulating, even non-verbally, how one feels 
about an object influences subsequent 
decisions (e.g., see White, Barqué-Duran, & 
Pothos, 2016). 
 The relationship between emotion, values, 
and evaluation has been further explored by 
Fingerhut and Prinz (2018). They argue that 
evaluative concepts qualify as abstract and are 
based on emotions linked to bodily 
perceptions. They extend this understanding 
of evaluation into morality, including justice, 
and aesthetics. Once again we see the 
argument that evaluation is an affective 
process that is largely automatic and which 
interacts bi-directionally with sensory 
perception—even in relation to morality based 
constructs such as justice. 
 These arguments can be readily 
extrapolated to any deliberate process of 
valuing, or judgement and assessment, and 
are important in relation to Evaluation. In 
simple terms, when a program is Evaluated 
there will be an impact of fluency with the 
program, attitude towards the program, and 
the set of beliefs and values held by 
evaluator/s and how those values and beliefs 
relate to those of the various groups of 
stakeholders. The extent to which 
methodological tools and processes can 
constrain these forces is an important 
question. 
 We should also take note that there are no 
noumenal values. That is, there are no 
absolute and unequivocal values that have an 
independent existence in and of themselves. 
Notions of value can be applied to any object, 
the value of ‘good’ being a particularly 
pertinent example. A bad thing can be a ‘good’ 
bad thing in that it is a good, or ideal, example 
of that bad thing. To suggest there is an 
absolute good is to completely ignore all 
relevant context and knowledge on the one 
hand, and to completely misunderstand the 
value of good on the other hand. (Issues of the 
various forms of social good—public good, 
common good, global good, and greater good—
are discussed elsewhere. The point here is 
simply that there is no known form of 
noumenal good; any interpretation of good is 
relative in a number of different and varying 
relations.) 
 What we do when we assign meaning, in 
the simplest possible terms, is we categorise 
something as good (beneficial), bad 
(detrimental), or indifferent (of no immediate 
affective consequence). Our categories of good, 
bad, and indifferent are formed, in large part, 
based on experience of an object and our 
affective response to that experience. Our 
experience of an object is always, to some 
extent, automatic and based on prior 
experience/s, but can be moderated by 
fluency and attitude and, probably, by any 
artefacts we use to engage with the object. 
Evaluation then, as a natural process in its 
base form, is simply the attribution of value 
and meaning to emotion in relation to physical 
perception of, and sensory response to, an 
object. 
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The Role of Evaluation in Relation 
to Science 
 
At its root the fundamental purpose of science, 
and indeed all other disciplines, is to isolate 
objects/phenomena and describe and explain 
them and their perceived significance within a 
clearly stated conceptual framework. In order 
to describe and explain objects science relies 
on critical evaluation (Kantor, 1919). Critical 
evaluation employs both a set of pre-defined 
and clearly articulated values and a set of 
processes, methods, designed to constrain the 
influence of values and value sets that are not 
directly related to valuing the object. 
 What science does is to endow objects with 
meaning in accordance with a clearly stated 
conceptual framework using the process of 
critical evaluation mediated by agreed values 
and methods. Science seeks to constrain the 
affective influence in evaluation and ensure 
that fluency with the object is managed within 
a shared set of boundaries. Attitudes and 
values are predetermined, consistent, and 
known. The ongoing critical evaluation of the 
object builds knowledge constructs which 
represent conditions, phenomena, and objects 
(bearing in mind that anything can be treated 
as an object and these distinctions are simply 
accepted and agreed terms for the sake of 
simplification and clarity). 
 Furthermore, science is very much 
concerned with change. It is concerned with 
how objects interact and bring about change, 
about how objects can be changed through 
deliberate intervention, about how objects 
change over time of their own accord, and so 
on. 
 Evaluation, more properly critical 
evaluation, is undoubtedly the primary 
artefact of science and is well recognised as 
such. The scientific methodology is one that 
serves to constrain and manage the impact of 
the automatic process of evaluation and bring 
it under some degree of control. 
 A range of specialist knowledges, methods, 
constructs, objects and values are bought into 
play and values, meanings, and objects vary 
within and between disciplines. In this sense 
we can consider evaluation, but not 
Evaluation, transdisciplinary in that all 
disciplines, not only the sciences, make use of 
evaluation. 
 With regard to Evaluation, there is a good 
reason to consider Evaluation scientific, 
especially as social change is driven by, and 
constructed on, values which are by default 
grounded in emotion and strongly held beliefs. 
When we look more closely at the history of 
Evaluation we shall see that this is exactly the 
effort made over time: to ensure that 
Evaluation is scientific (i.e. makes use of the 
methodologies employed by the sciences. Note, 
these methodologies do not exclude qualitative 
methods.) 
 With further regard to science’s 
understanding of the role of evaluation in 
science, Zuckerman and Merton (1971) noted 
that while science depends on status judges 
engaged in an evaluation process that process 
is not exempt itself from being evaluated. 
 
Evaluation is Ubiquitous in the 
Sciences 
 
As a simple demonstration of the ubiquity of 
evaluation in a very wide range of sciences and 
related disciplines I conducted a search of a 
small number of journals, collections of 
journals, and publishing houses for the term 
‘evaluation’. Searching collections of journals 
and publishers is informative as it provides 
insight not only into the range of publications 
and articles but also the range of disciplines 
knowingly engaged with evaluation (to include 
Evaluation).  (Searches such as this clearly 
produce a number of false positives. These will 
not affect the overall picture as the risk of false 
positives is consistent across all searches.) 
 The selection of journals and publishing 
houses was purposive and value-based and 
intended to give a simple snapshot of the range 
of primarily scientific journals and scientific 
journal publications concerned with 
evaluation in the sciences and related fields 
and disciplines relevant to policy and 
programs. The results are presented in Table 
One along with a set of accompanying notes. 
 What we can see from Table 1 and the 
Notes is: (1) the enormous number of articles 
published that refer to evaluation (4.8 million 
from this search alone); and (2) the enormous 
number of evaluation-specific articles 
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published and the wide range of objects 
subject to scientific evaluation (229,772 
articles with evaluation in the title; 5% of 
articles in the related searches). Furthermore, 
a large number of these evaluations are 
concerned with social change. 
 Searching Google Scholar for publications 
containing ‘evaluation’ anywhere gives 
6,220,00 results with 292,00 added in the last 
year (2019). Limiting ‘evaluation’ to the title 
gives 980,000 results with 88,000 added in the 
last year (2019). However, limiting the search 
to articles containing ‘program evaluation’ 
anywhere gives only 757,00 results. When this 
is limited to the title it gives only 13,800 
results. It is feasible that this latter set could 
be analysed for the range of journals to reflect 
the number and range of disciplines overtly 




Results of Searches for ‘Evaluation’ Across Select Number of Journals, Collections of Journals, and 
Publishers and Accompanying Notes 
 
Journal/Publisher 




The Annual Review series (Group of journals) 18,959 127  
Public Administration 1449 33  
The International Journal of Public Administration 730,725 73  
The Journal of the American Medical Association 
(Group of Journals/Publications) 76,343 5,385  
Academy of Management journals (Group of 
journals) 11,639 430  
Administrative Science Quarterly 507 9  
Nature (Group of journals) 124,505 3,746  
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London (Group of journals) 7,497 243  
American Physical Society (Group of journals) 44,286 853  
American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(Group of journals) 2,878 Not searched  
American Chemical Society (Group of journals) 347,064 10,686  
Hindawi (Group of Open Access journals) 112,132 35,711  
Directory of Open Access Journals (Group of Open 
Access journals) 202,400 69,160  
Springer (Publisher) 3,136,112 101, 935  
Elsevier Journals (Publisher) 
250 journals (not 
articles) Not searched See Note 1 
Taylor and Francis (Publisher) 1,664,072 Not searched See Note 2 
Sage (Publisher) 3,258 Not searched See Note 3 
 
Note 1. Examples of the journals and the sort of evaluations they publish include: Research in Social and Administrative 
Pharmacy: ‘Topics of interest include outcomes evaluation of drug products, programs, or services…’; Nuclear Data 
Sheets: ‘…devoted to compilation and evaluations of experimental and theoretical results in Nuclear Physics…’; 
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International Journal of Child-Computer Interaction : ‘…New methods for working with children in design, evaluation 
and research…’; Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice : ‘…design, management and evaluation of 
transportation systems....’; Artificial Intelligence : ‘…describe a principled solution, emphasize its novelty, and 
present an in-depth evaluation of...’. 
Note 2. A scan of the titles of the journal articles and where they are published gives a good idea of both:  External 
Government Performance Evaluation in China: Evaluating the Evaluations, in Public Performance Management 
Review; Evaluation, or Just Data Collection? An Exploration of the Evaluation Practice of Selected UK Environmental 
Educators, in The Journal of Environmental Education; How well are aid agencies evaluating programs? An 
assessment of the quality of global health evaluations, in Journal of Developmental Effectiveness; Evaluating publicly 
supported periodic events: the design of credible, usable and effective evaluation, in Journal of Policy Research in 
Tourism, Leisure and Events. 
Note 3. This range includes textbooks, professional books, and journals all concerned, primarily, with the Social Sciences. 
 
What is Program Evaluation? 
 
Program Evaluation is the value-based 
assessment, and judgement, of some sort of 
deliberate social intervention, including 
organizational interventions, designed to bring 
about some sort of intended social change. The 
use of the term ‘some sort’ indicates both the 
complexity and confusion typically, one might 
argue inevitably, associated with these 
interventions. In that sense Evaluation is very 
much based in the Social Sciences and similar 
disciplines as it is concerned with social 
problems. (The object of Social Science is 
perceived social problems, however and 
wherever these arise.) 
 Evaluation is not a social change 
movement. It is a sort of amorphous discipline 
or a professional practice whose object of 
inquiry is interventions intended to bring 
about social change. When Evaluation 
assumes to directly and intentionally 
influence social change it becomes both a 
program in its own right and a 
political/activist movement and can and 
should be fully and critically evaluated as 
such with named bodies and persons 
assuming responsibility for the outcomes. 
While such a movement can exist within the 
field of Evaluation such a movement cannot 
assume to speak for the entire field without 
the approval and endorsement of the entire 
field. 
 As we have already seen, science requires 
the use of critical evaluation, and arguably 
this is true also for Evaluation (although this 
can be contested). Assuming, however, that 
Evaluation relies on critical evaluation there 
must be a set of clearly articulated values and 
a set of clearly articulated methods that both 
serve to constrain and bound the conclusions 
of the process of an enacted Evaluation. 
 There is a strong suggestion that there are, 
indeed, a distinct set of values about ‘good’ 
that are central to Evaluation in relation to the 
object. (Broader understandings of ‘social 
good’ currently assumed by some sectors of 
the field of Evaluation form a separate and 
distinct discussion and this is addressed 
elsewhere.) These values have been articulated 
historically as Effectiveness and Efficiency: (1) 
Does the program do what it is meant to do, 
does it bring about the intended change and 
what change, if any, does it bring about; the 
falsity of the behaviourist surrogate argument 
notwithstanding. The behaviourist surrogate 
argument advanced by Sociology in relation to 
Evaluation (Gordon & Morse, 1975) is that the 
goals of the program need to be known and 
clear for an Evaluation to be conducted. This 
is not the case and the argument against this 
in the context of Evaluation was provided by 
Scriven (1973). Furthermore, the behaviourist 
surrogate argument is untenable when we 
consider the process of evaluation in relation 
to contact with unknown objects; and, (2) is 
the program cost-effective (is the cost of the 
program appropriate in relation to the 
perceived benefit), and is there a cost-benefit 
(do the benefits outweigh the financial costs 
regardless of whether or not the cost is 
appropriate). These are core values against 
which any program can be assessed. However, 
they are not enough. 
 A further set of pertinent values in 
Evaluation are those of the policy makers, the 
ultimate owners of the program—those who 
are responsible for the program. When we 
Evaluate a program the values, the intents, of 
the policy makers are critical in order to 
appreciate what the pre-existing merit, worth, 
and significance is to the policy maker as this 
will impact on everything from the 
commissioning of the Evaluation to how the 
results are interpreted. It also shines a light 
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into the inner-mechanisms of the program. 
And it may well be that a program reviled by 
the evaluand is successful in bringing about 
an intended change, which may or may not be 
‘good’, and so on. (Clearly, the reverse may 
also be the case.) 
 This is not to say the values of the policy 
makers will determine the merit, worth, and 
significance of the program per se, but they 
will determine the merit, worth, and 
significance of the program for the policy 
makers. 
 This does not mean that those values 
cannot be queried or challenged, and it does 
not mean that other sets of values cannot 
equally be considered. Indeed, a good 
Evaluation attributes meaning/value in 
accord with both the values of the policy 
makers and the values of the evaluand. These 
values may be, or may not be, in accord with 
each other and consequently the Evaluation 
may find that the object, the program, has 
different meaning/value for the different 
groups. 
 The importance of the values of the policy 
maker is almost clarified by Scriven (2007) 
when he says, “The key issue for program 
evaluators is the effects the program actually 
had, measured in terms of what they meant to 
those affected (and those you did not reach), 
whether or not you meant to have those 
effects…” (p. 8). In other words, what meaning 
did the program have for the policy maker in 
relation to the evaluand, and this can only be 
determined in relation to the values of the 
policy maker. Furthermore, Scriven explicates 
the types of value claims and these claims are 
very much in keeping with the values of the 
product/policy maker and do not always 
necessarily reflect the values or attributed 
meaning of the evaluand. 
 As a final note it behoves us to remember 
that the road to hell is paved with good 
intentions. A good program does not need the 
policy makers to hold a set of values that 
another community, or even the intended 
recipients of the program, considers good. 
Similarly, a program that is highly valued by 
the intended recipients (the evaluand) in the 
short term may do great harm in the longer 
term and may dramatically exacerbate the 
problem the program was intended to resolve. 
And so on. What this highlights is the need for 
evaluators not to allow their own values to 
influence the Evaluation but to utilise the 
relevant value sets of Evaluation, the policy 
maker, and other stakeholders and not to 
privilege one set of values over and above the 
other (at least until the value set of Evaluation 
is clearly determined, agreed, and established 
and the methodology to manage and bound 
the influence of these values is equally 
established and agreed).  
 That having been said there are clearly 
dominant values that need to be considered 
because policy makers will base their 
decisions on these values and an Evaluation 
that does not take account of them lacks 
relevance other than from the moral position 
of the evaluator, and it is not the evaluator’s 
role to make moral judgements from their own 
entrenched moral position. 
 
A Plausible History of Program 
Evaluation 
 
The recent history of Evaluation largely 
assumes it can be traced back to the New Deal 
era of Rooseveldt 1933-1936 in the United 
States. While there is a good argument that 
Evaluation became widely acknowledged by 
the United States government during this time 
this cannot be taken as the origin of 
Evaluation. 
 To gain some idea of a more 
comprehensive understanding of the historical 
origins of Evaluation I conducted a simple 
search of the British Library Catalogue for the 
keyword ‘evaluation’. This gave 1,440,427 
results. Scanning the results showed an 
eclectic mix. I narrowed the search down to 
‘books’ with ‘evaluation’ as a key word. The 
results contained publications as early as 
1640, which are French ‘economic 
evaluations’. They translated as ‘valuations’ 
and relate to valuing different currencies. 
However, as Scriven and others have noted, 
evaluation is the valuing of an object.  
 The French continued to publish on 
evaluation through the 1700s-1800s 
including evaluation relating to quantity 
(weights and measures) and quality. However, 
it was not limited to this. A reasonable 
assessment of these early French publications 
on evaluation show they were concerned 
primarily with money/currency, weights and 
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measures, and proceedings of the king’s court. 
In other words: economics, science, and 
politics/policy. Thus there is every reason to 
suggest, bearing further investigation, that 
Evaluation and the use of evaluation in 
Science in its current form, has its roots in 
France from c. 1600-1800+. 
 Progressing into the 1900s there is a 
strong growth in the number and range of 
English language publications across a range 
of topics and particularly in relation to ‘the 
Arts’ (see Table 2 for an overview of the 
evolution of evaluation c. 1900-1960). 
Between 1920 and 1940 we start to see the 
first recognisable modern Evaluations emerge 
in the United States in relation to Social 
Security, Education especially, ‘Public Policy’ 
(loosely framed), and other areas. (Noting that 
evaluation publications continue in France 
during this time and in other domains.) 
Evaluation seems to be recognisable 
predominantly, but not exclusively, in 
Education during this period. Between 1940-
1950 both evaluation and Evaluation appear 
well established and flourishing across many 
domains, including the Arts. 
 
Table 2 




Manual of Descriptive Annotation for Library Catalogues ... With chapter on evaluation and 
historical note. 
1916 
Digitalis Standardization. The Physiological Evaluation of Fat-Free Digitalis and Commercial 
Digitalin. By G. B. Roth. II. Preliminary Observations of Metabolism in Pellagra. 
1917 Bohemia : a brief evaluation of Bohemia's contribution to civilization. 
1920 Evaluation of an intellectual. 
1928 
American Foreign Policies: an Examination and Evaluation of Certain Traditional and Recent 
International Policies of the United States. 
1930 An Experimental Evaluation of Equality Judgments in Psychophysics. 
1932 Evaluation of Types of Student-teaching, etc. 
1932 
Methods and Techniques used in Surveying Health and Physical Education in City Schools. An 
analysis and evaluation, etc. [A thesis.] 
1934 
Evaluation of Oils from the Manufacture of Carburetted Water Gas by their Available 
Hydrogen Content. Extracted from a dissertation submitted by P. J. Merkus, etc. 
1937 The Evaluation of Permanent Incapacity for Work in Social Insurance. 
1937 Yoga. A scientific evaluation. [With plates.] 
1938 Evaluation of the Supravital Staining Method. 
1944 
A method for the rapid evaluation of Glauert's expressions for the angle of zero lift and the 
moment at zero lift. 
1945 Work-Book in Educational Measurements and Evaluation. 
1947 Job Evaluation for Launderers and Dry Cleaners. 
1947 Student Exercises in Measurement and Evaluation for Education and Guidance.   
1947 
The planned state: an evaluation of the social and economic foundations of the state in the 
light of a comparative study of the conditions in the east Asiatic and western countries. 




1948 Evaluation of Choral Music. Methods of appraising the practical value of choral compositions with reference to music generally available in the United States, etc. [A thesis.]   
1950 Evaluation of Indexes of Maturity for Apples. 
1950 Evaluation of Citizenship Training and Incentive in American Colleges and Universities, etc.   
1950 
Medieval Skepticism and Chaucer. An evaluation of the skepticism of the 13th and 14th 
centuries of Geoffrey Chaucer and his immediate predecessors, etc. 
1954 The “Isms.” A history and evaluation.   
1956 Evaluation in Extension ... Preliminary, June 1956. 
1957 
A Moral Evaluation of the American Law regarding Literary Obscenity. Dissertation ad 
lauream, etc. 
1957 Man and Culture. An evaluation of the work of Bronislaw Malinowski. 
1958 Statistical techniques in missile evaluation. 
1958 Symposium on the Evaluation of Drug Toxicity. 
1958 PERT Program Evaluation Research Task. Summary report. Phase 1. 
1958 Pig carcass evaluation. 
1958 Democracy, Social Science and Evaluation. 
1959 
Seminar on Evaluation and Utilization of Population Census Data in Latin America. Santiago, 
Chile, 30 November-18 December 1959, etc. 
1960 Psychological Techniques in Diagnosis and Evaluation.   
1960 ESP in Relation to Rorschach Test Evaluation. 
 
Note. *All titles taken from the search of the British Library. 
 
 In the 1950s-1960s evaluation appears to 
have expanded in terms of remit and scope 
and Evaluation became established as a state 
mechanism with its own department. Not in 
the United States, but in India with the 
development of the Programme Evaluation 
Organization (1952). This appears to be one of 
the earliest, although not the only, instance/s 
of the use of the term Programme Evaluation 
and perhaps the first [modern] government 
office dedicated specifically to this purpose. It 
is worth noting that at around the same time 
(1955) the United States Department of 
Defence set up a covert paramilitary mission 
to the Kingdom of Laos: The Programs 
Evaluation Office. Also, in 1957/8 the U.S. 
Navy Special Projects Office developed and 
established the Program Evaluation and 
Review Technique. 
 Throughout this latter period the use of 
evaluation is widespread and objects as 
diverse as statistical techniques in missile 
testing, ‘Isms’, ESP, the law and literary 
obscenity, pig carcasses, and the work of 
Bronislaw Malinowski were being evaluated 
and the role of evaluation in democracy and 
social science was being written about. From 
the 1960s onwards not only was the use of 
evaluation widespread but Evaluation quite 
literally exploded across the policy world. 
 I put forward that modern Evaluation has, 
thus far, two distinct eras. The first began in 
the 16th century France and was concerned 
primarily with money, weights and measures, 
and proceedings of the king’s court 
(economics, science, and policy). The second 
phase did indeed emerge in the United States 
as early as the 1920s and was born in the 
fields of Education, Social Security, and 
Employment/Work, all of which are strongly 
interconnected. The embedded institutional 
origins of Evaluation in direct relation to 
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government first emerged in India in the form 
of a specialist government office. What we 
must not lose sight of is that evaluation as an 
artefact was simultaneously developing 
equally rapidly across a whole range of 
activities, practices, and disciplines (see Table 
2). 
 
A Disciplinary Perspective of the 
Modern History of Program 
Evaluation 
 
The argument that Evaluation is a distinct 
discipline is well rehearsed but neither 
universally acknowledged nor accepted. More 
widely accepted is that Evaluation is a practice 
of the Social Sciences—although this is 
debatable and it depends on what is classed 
as a Social Science. Further to this, Evaluation 
was demonstrably central the founding 
doctrines of the Social Sciences in the early 
1900s (Weber, 1949). As an aside it is 
acknowledged that there are a number of 
distinct schools of Evaluation that have 
emerged as independent entities (e.g., 
Empowerment Evaluation, Randomised 
Evaluation, Realist Evaluation, and Utilization 
Focused Evaluation), but they do not 
constitute disciplines in their own right either 
individually or collectively and for the most 
part they are contained within, or constrained 
by, other disciplinary boundaries with regard 
to the philosophical underpinnings and 
methods that bound and constrain the 
associated value set/s. 
 In the absence of due consideration of the 
contribution of various disciplines to 
Evaluation, and the role of those disciplines, 
historic and ongoing, in the practice of 
Evaluation there can be no valid historical 
understanding of Evaluation (except that it is 
limited to substantial constraints and objects, 
see for example the work of: Ayob & Morell, 
2016; Hogan, 2007; King & Alkin, 2016; King 
& Alkin, 2019). 
 The Annual Review series of journals 
provide annual reviews of key topics and 
developments within distinct disciplines. The 
reviews are conducted by eminent scholars 
and practitioners within the disciplines and 
reflect and represent both the historic and 
current state of understanding of the topic 
within the discipline. As such they provide 
something of a ‘level playing field’ for assessing 
any one topic, or range of topics, both within 
and across the disciplines covered by the 
Annual Reviews. 
 Over the years, I have conducted regular 
searches of the series for papers on 
‘evaluation’ and papers with ‘evaluation’ in the 
title. This reveals an accepted and 
documented history of the understanding of 
the topic within and between disciplines. For 
the purposes of this essay I conducted a fresh 
search for reviews with ‘evaluation’ in the title. 
I exercised some leeway in selecting the papers 
and made an effort to select only those papers 
that commented directly on social intervention 
and particularly those papers that also had 
‘program’ and/or ‘policy’ and/or ‘intervention’ 
in the title. 
 Table 3 lists the Annual Review journal of 
publication, the year of publication, and the 
title of the selected paper. Authors have not 
been listed as it is the topic that is of interest 
as represented by the title. The largest number 
of relevant titles was found in [The Annual 
Review of] Public Health with 16 titles between 
1980-2019, next was Psychology (including 
two sub-disciplines) with nine titles between 
1976-2019, followed by Economics (including 
one sub-discipline) with seven titles between 
2009-2018, then Sociology with four titles 
between 1975-2012, Statistics with two titles 
between 2014-2018, and finally three 
disciplines grouped together in the category 














List of Titles relating to Evaluation in the Annual Review series of journals 
 
 
Annual Review of Year Title 
Public Health 
Public Health 1980 Economic Evaluation of Public Health Programs 
Public Health 1981 
Primary Prevention of Ischemic Heart Disease: Evaluation of Community 
Interventions 
Public Health 1991 
The 20-Year Experiment: Accounting for, Explaining, and Evaluating Health 
Care Cost Containment in Canada and the United States 
Public Health 1992 
Selected Methodological Issues in Evaluating Community-Based Health 
Promotion and Disease Prevention Programs 
Public Health 1994 
Relapse Prevention for Smoking Cessation: Review and Evaluation of 
Concepts and Interventions 
Public Health 1996 Economic Evaluation of HIV Prevention Programs 
Public Health 1998 Evaluating the Cost-Effectiveness of Clinical and Public Health Measures 
Public Health 2000 Preference-Based Measures in Economic Evaluation in Health Care 
Public Health 2006 Process Evaluation for Community Participation 
Public Health 2010 
Evaluability Assessment to Improve Public Health Policies, Programs, and 
Practices 
Public Health 2012 
Economic Evaluation of Pharmaco- and Behavioral Therapies for Smoking 
Cessation: A Critical and Systematic Review of Empirical Research 
Public Health 2014 Evaluation of Systems-Oriented Public Health Interventions: Alternative Research Designs 
Public Health 2017 
Evaluating the Health Impact of Large-Scale Public Policy Changes: Classical 
and Novel Approaches 
Public Health 2017 
An Overview of Research and Evaluation Designs for Dissemination and 
Implementation 
Public Health 2017 
Public Health Surveillance Systems: Recent Advances in Their Use and 
Evaluation 
Public Health 2019 Innovations in Mixed Methods Evaluations 
Psychology 
Psychology 1976 Program Evaluation 
Psychology 1980 Evaluation Research 
Psychology 1983 Evaluation Research: A Methodological Perspective 
Psychology 1986 Program Evaluation: The Worldly Science 
Psychology 1993 Program Evaluation 
Psychology 2000 Evaluation Methods for Social Intervention 
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Annual Review of Year Title 
Psychology 2008 The Renaissance of Field Experimentation in Evaluating Interventions 
Clinical Psychology 2012 
Development, Evaluation, and Multinational Dissemination of the Triple P-





2019 Measurement Development and Evaluation 
Economics 
Economics 2009 
Improving Education in the Developing World: What Have We Learned 
from Randomized Evaluations? 
Economics 2010 Structural Estimation and Policy Evaluation in Developing Countries 
Economics 2018 Econometric Methods for Program Evaluation 
Resource Economics 2009 
Behavior, Environment, and Health in Developing Countries: Evaluation and 
Valuation 
Resource Economics 2010 Providing Safe Water: Evidence from Randomized Evaluations 
Resource Economics 2011 The New Economics of Evaluating Water Projects 
Resource Economics 2018 Advances in Evaluating Energy Efficiency Policies and Programs 
Sociology 
Sociology 1975 Evaluation Research 
Sociology 1984 Evaluation Research: An Assessment 
Sociology 1987 Network Approaches to Social Evaluation 
Sociology 2012 Toward a Comparative Sociology of Valuation and Evaluation 
Statistics 
Statistics and Its 
Application 2014 
A Systematic Statistical Approach to Evaluating Evidence from 
Observational Studies 
Statistics and Its 




Definition and Evaluation of the Fitness of Behavioral and Developmental 
Programs 
Environment and 
Resources 2010 Evaluating Energy Efficiency Policies with Energy-Economy Models 
Nutrition 2019 
Evidence Collection and Evaluation for the Development of Dietary 
Guidelines and Public Policy on Nutrition 
 Given the direct relevance of the titles to 
Evaluation across this range of disciplines it is 
inappropriate to comment on less than all of 
them for the purposes of this essay, so I 
haven’t. What does emerge from assessing the 
titles alone is: (1) a number of titles 
demonstrate the use of Evaluation in relation 
to a discipline relevant object; (2) a number of 
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titles demonstrate the contribution to the 
development of Evaluation by that particular 
discipline; and (3)  the importance of both 
economic and methodological considerations. 
 Equally interesting is the temporal spread 
within each discipline. Public Health has 
reviewed Evaluation consistently and 
constantly since 1980. Psychology similarly, 
though not to the same extent and the 
contribution is arguably different. Sociology 
had a small spread of reviews with large gaps 
also since 1975. Economics does not start 
reviewing the topic until 2009, roughly the 
time when psychology and sociology began to 
tail off their contribution. Statistical reviews 
don’t start until 2014. While psychology and 
sociology are much concerned with Evaluation 
as an object the other disciplines seem more 
concerned with Evaluation in relation to 
economics,cost-effectiveness, implementation, 
and policy implications. 
 This is, as already noted, little more than 
a glimpse of what promises to be a very rich 
historical tapestry indeed and I suggest that 
much could be learned from a substantive 
review of these reviews especially if additional 
titles were included. 
 Similarly to the Annual Review series the 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
of London, the world’s first and longest-
running scientific journal/s, provides an 
overview of key topics and developments 
across scientific disciplines rather than within 
them. I conducted a search for articles with 
‘evaluation’ in the title, and again exercised 
some leeway in selecting the papers, and made 
an effort to select only those papers that 
commented directly on social intervention. The 




Selected articles from a search of Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (Only 
articles with ‘evaluation’ in the title and that reflect on social intervention selected) 
 
Year Title 
1973 Advanced technology in the hospital laboratory: Equipment for clinical chemistry and its evaluation. 
1976 Evaluation of existing techniques: Is ‘the pill’ safe enough to continue using? 
1977 Evaluation of land-use and land-treatment practices in semi-arid western United States. 
1977 The evaluation and exploitation of the West African Sahel. 
1977 The evaluation and exploitation of semi-arid lands: Australian experience. 
1980 Methods, equipment and techniques for rural health care and their evaluation - The people. 
1981 Quantification of biological risk assessment and evaluation of risks to health from chemicals. 
1990 Land resources inventory and productivity evaluation for national development planning. 
2008 
An age-structured model to evaluate the potential of novel malaria-control interventions: a case study of 
fungal biopesticide sprays. 
2010 
New directions in management strategy evaluation through cross-fertilization between fisheries science 
and terrestrial conservation 
2011 
Evaluation of vaccines against enteric infections: a clinical and public health research agenda for 
developing countries. 
2014 Veterinary and human vaccine evaluation methods. 
2015 Using prediction markets to forecast research evaluations. 
2015 
Evaluating the potential impact of enhancing HIV treatment and tuberculosis control programmes on the 
burden of tuberculosis. 




2015 Impact evaluation to communicate and improve conservation non-governmental organization performance: the case of Conservation International. 
2015 Integrating impact evaluation in the design and implementation of monitoring marine protected areas. 
2015 International funding agencies: potential leaders of impact evaluation in protected areas? 
2016 
 
Re-evaluating the health of coral reef communities: baselines and evidence for human impacts across 
the central Pacific. 
2016 System-level approach needed to evaluate the transition to more sustainable agriculture. 
2016 
The National Eclipse Weather Experiment: use and evaluation of a citizen science tool for schools 
outreach. 
2017 Evaluation of natural sounds in urban greenery: potential impact for urban nature preservation. 
2018 Evaluation of mechanistic and statistical methods in forecasting influenza-like illness. 
 
 Once again it is clear that not only 
evaluation but evaluation of social 
interventions is wide-spread and far reaching 
and carried out from within scientific 
disciplines. What is interesting here is the 
increasing number of evaluations of social 
interventions and the range of what are either 
social interventions or topics immediately 
relevant to wider range of social policy and 
programs. 
 The point being, there is a well-
documented history of Evaluation within and 
across relevant Social Science and other 
disciplines that will shed objective light on the 
modern history of Evaluation and the 
contributions these disciplines have made and 
continue to make. Furthermore, these 
disciplines have a high impact on policy 
makers and knowing the disciplinary position 
on Evaluation also sheds light on influences 
on, and the workings of, policy makers and 
policy making. 
 
Program Evaluation as Evaluation 
Science 
 
The notion of Evaluation as Applied Social 
Science renamed as Evaluation Science was 
mooted as early as 1990 (Rossi). Recent 
developments have seen the book chapter, 
Evolving Methods in Evaluation Science, in a 
publication by The National Academies Press 
(Olson, 2014), the establishment of the Office 
of Evaluation Sciences (2015) housed by the 
U.S. General Services Administration, the 
creation of the post of Director for the Office of 
Drug Evaluation Sciences at the United States 
Food and Drug Administration’s Office of New 
Drugs (October, 2019; see Regulatory Focus, 
2019), and the awarding of the Nobel Prize for 
Economics (2019) to a team of highly 
respected evaluators who developed and 
established the school of Randomised 
Evaluation, which serves as the engine for the 
emerging discipline of Development 
Economics. The point here being that the 
notion of Evaluation Science is at least 30 
years in the making and is clearly evident in 
the world of United States’ policy. 
 Patton (2018) articulates Evaluation 
Science as, “…systematic inquiry into how, 
and how well, interventions aimed at changing 
the world work. Evaluation science involves 
systematic inquiry into the merit, worth, 
utility, and significance of whatever is being 
evaluated by adhering to scientific norms…” 
(p. 184). This explanation is simply an 
explanation of science, it is what science does. 
The single object that differs somewhat 
obliquely from a pure explanation of what 
science does is the phrase “…how well, 
interventions aimed at changing the world 
work” (p. 184). However, the interventions 
Patton refers to are actually aimed at 
addressing and resolving perceived and 
interpreted social problems rather than 
changing the world. This understanding is one 
that is consistently repeated throughout both 
science and Evaluation. Consider, for 
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example, Trochim’s (1998) explanation of 
Evaluation as, “…a profession that uses 
formal methodologies to provide useful 
empirical evidence about public entities…in 
decision making contexts…” (p. 248). 
 Patton continues that evaluators have 
access to a body of knowledge about, “…ways 
of applying knowledge to design and improve 
interventions, both based on empirically and 
theoretically validated patterns of successes 
across interventions and evaluations” (p. 188). 
To some extent this may indeed be the case, 
but there is little empirical evidence, if any, to 
suggest that this occurs outside of boundaries 
of recognised and distinct disciplines whose 
objects are specific [social] problems. The 
counter argument is that the majority of 
knowledge applied to designing and improving 
[social] interventions comes not from the 
proprietary Evaluation literature but from 
relevant discipline specific literature. Of 
course, it very much depends on what we 
mean by ‘evaluators’ and how we assume that 
particular group is constituted. 
 What we know, if anything, from the last 
100 years of Evaluation, is that it is 
remarkably difficult to develop a [social] policy 
and implement a program that will 
consistently produce the desired results with 
the desired effect. There are any number of 
reasons for this ranging from the way in which 
the problem is both perceived and constructed 
through the nature of social institutions to 
failures in the fidelity of implementation to 
poorly designed programs that set out with 
good intentions to a lack of relevant 
disciplinary theory and evidence to corruption 
to a failure to take account of varying context. 
This was articulated, demonstrated, and 
explored in some depth by Tharp and 
Gallimore (1979), which remains one of the 
definitive Evaluation reflections on this/these 
point/s. 
 Patton notes that a ‘reservoir of knowledge’ 
exists within the Evaluation community that 
can be drawn upon to design, implement, and 
evaluation interventions. What we need to 
recognise is that a further, perhaps more 
extensive, reservoir of relevant knowledge 
exists within the disciplinary literatures, as 
indicated and demonstrated earlier. 
 There is also the argument that program 
evaluators have the knowledge, skills, and 
expertise to advise on the design, 
development, and implementation of 
interventions to address social problems. This 
is a bold statement and it supposes a level of 
knowledge and skill that goes far beyond the 
knowledge and skill required to Evaluate a 
social intervention. Furthermore, the inherent 
value of Evaluation as a craft is that it not only 
adheres to a set of relevant disciplinary 
specific values and methodological practices - 
to the object, either a program in this case or 
an object relating to a program—but also uses 
these to methodologically, logically, and 
philosophically constrain the evidence 
according to both those [disciplinary] values 
and the values held by the policy maker and 
the evaluand (and if appropriate other 
stakeholders, but there are limits). Put 
another way, the inherent worth of an 
evaluation carried out as Evaluation is that 
the evaluator has no inherent ‘personal’, 
value-based, vested interest in the design, 
development, and implementation of 
interventions to address social problems. The 
value bases are disciplinary first and policy 
maker and evaluand second. (This raises 
questions about the role of institutional 
values, naturally, but this is best addressed in 
a more advanced exploration of the institution 
per se.) 
 Of course, much of the above argument 
depends on how ‘program evaluator’ is 
defined. There are many within-discipline 
program evaluators who do not consider 
themselves program evaluators per se, and 
many program evaluators per se whose first 
loyalty is to their discipline. As such, we need 
to take care to give full and due consideration 
as to what we mean when we use the term 
program evaluator (shortened to evaluator in 
most cases). 
 
A Conclusion of Sorts 
 
The conclusion I draw is that Evaluation 
expertise is first and foremost located within 
disciplines rather than as a distinct practice. 
It seems to me that the key to a robust 
community of Evaluation with its own norms, 
standards, and practices is to draw on the 
extant literature across a very wide range of 
disciplines and collate and examine this 
broader literature. The assumption that there 
is an innate and unique reservoir of 
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knowledge, skills, and experience within a 
self-proclaimed group set within a large and 
varied field made up of any number of 
disciplines seems lacking. Acknowledging the 
wider field has the potential to position the 
smaller Evaluation community—that group 
concerned primarily with Evaluation rather 
than working from within an established 
discipline and conducting Evaluation—as an 
honest broker with the stewardship of a wider 
body of knowledge, skills, experience, and 
understanding. In respect of this the question 
emerges as follows: What are the objects of the 
proprietary Evaluation literature and are there 
any objects not found elsewhere in other 
disciplinary literature? (This should not be 
confused with an armchair exercise of 
collating and summarising definitions.) 
 With regard to Evaluation Science, two 
considerations emerge. Firstly, evaluation is 
ubiquitous within disciplines and within the 
sciences in particular. It has been well studied 
within various science disciplines and is well 
utilised by any number of disciplines including 
for the purpose of Evaluation. Further to this 
there is the suggestion that the majority of 
Evaluations are conducted from within 
existing disciplines rather than from within a 
distinct discipline called ‘Evaluation’. This 
renders it difficult to allocate Evaluation as a 
proprietary object to any one distinct 
discipline. Even more difficult to suggest that 
there is a distinct discipline with either 
Evaluation or evaluation as its object of 
concern. Can we say that there is a distinct 
discipline of Evaluation that studies 
Evaluation? That is not to say it is not possible 
to study evaluation, as has been done, and it 
is not to say it is not possible to study 
Evaluation, as has been done. What appears 
to be the case, however, from a broad and long 
historical survey of the extant literature is that 
the study of Evaluation has, again, taken place 
from within distinct disciplines such as Public 
Health, Psychology, Sociology, and latterly 
Economics, and it is within those disciplines 
that the greatest advances have been made. 
Similarly, if we look at studies of evaluation it 
is within psychology that the greatest 
advances have been made. And if we look at 
the discipline of Education we see extensive 
study, analysis, and development of both 
evaluation and Evaluation taking place within 
the discipline. 
 Second, Evaluation Science is a relatively 
long-standing construct. It has been 
definitively operationalised by Life and Medical 
Sciences to conduct Evaluation (allowing for 
some expansion of the definitional boundary 
of Evaluation). Judging by its existing 
operationalisation The Evaluation Sciences 
utilise disciplinary specific methodologies 
appropriate to the object and is arguably the 
engine of at least one new discipline, 
Development Economics. We also see 
Evaluation Science being re-incorporated into 
disciplines and their objects such as Public 
Health (Table 3), Conservation (Table 4), 
Nuclear Physics, and Artificial Intelligence 
(Table 1). Given this, to assume that a group 
within a field can assume the role of 
Evaluation Scientists, or that a self-defined 
group can rebrand its efforts as Evaluation 
Science, risks putting that group in direct 
conflict with an existing and already 
established community of practice. That is not 
to say that Evaluation is not scientific, nor 
that it cannot be scientific. But is there any 
need for the community of Evaluators, or a 
self-selecting community of Evaluators, to 
engage with a fashionable motif? It may be 
there is a good reason on the one hand, but on 
the other hand it may indicate remarkably 
poor judgement given the wider community of 
Evaluators will by default already include 
those engaged with Evaluation Science but not 
all Evaluators will be engaged with Evaluation 
Science nor will they all be recognised as 
Evaluation Scientists. 
 Finally, none of the above should be taken 
as a critique of the ongoing efforts to 
professionalise Evaluation—a separate and 
much needed critique—nor should it be taken 
to suggest that those engaged with Evaluation 
are in any way lacking in necessary and 
sufficient disciplinary skills, expertise, 
knowledge, and perspective. What I question 
is: (1) whether or not Evaluation can 
realistically be considered a distinct 
discipline—as opposed to a practice exercised 
from within an existing discipline relevant to 
the object—and if it can then what is/are its 
object/s; and (2) is there any value to the wider 
Evaluation community in assuming that 
Evaluation as a whole is Evaluation Science 
and if that argument is to be made how is it 
supported and validated? 
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